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Social Services and
Mutual Aid in Times
of COVID-19 and
Beyond:
A Brief Critique
by Dana Neacsu*

May 19, 2021, marked a crucial point in the United
States’ fight against the COVID-19 pandemic: sixty
percent of U.S. adults had been vaccinated.1 Since
then, Americans have witnessed the beginning of
the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, but its longterm effects are here to stay. Ironically, some are
unexpectedly welcome. Among the lasting positive
changes is an augmented sense of individual
involvement in community well-being. This
multifaceted phenomenon has given rise to #BLM

* Dana Neacsu is an Associate Professor and Director of the
Center for Legal Information at Duquesne University School of
Law, and Political Science Lecturer at Columbia University. A
version of this paper was presented to After the Welfare State:
Reconceiving Mutual Aid, the 2020 Annual Telos-Paul Piccone Institute Conference, NYC, February 2020, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=vxDT9JFuVUY. Dana would like to thank
Human Rights Brief editors for their thoughtful editing. Izzie and
ZouZou, always grateful to listen to your views. This is for you.
1
Christina Maxouris & Holly Yan, About 60% Of American
Adults Have Had At Least One Dose Of Covid-19 Vaccine,
Including More People of Color, CNN (May 19, 2021), https://
www.cnn.com/2021/05/18/health/us-coronavirus-tuesday/
index.html.
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allyship2 and heightened interest in mutual aid
networks.3 In the legal realm, it has manifested
with law students, their educators, lawyers, and the
American Bar Association (ABA) proposing new
educational standards: law schools ought to build
a curriculum centered on social justice, equity,
diversity, and inclusion rather than the traditional
fixation of “thinking like a lawyer” law programs.4
On a larger, political, social, and legal plan, calling
for social justice is a call for sustainable democratic
capitalism.5 And a democracy is as vibrant as
its welfare system is.6 Calling out social services
for being unsatisfactory and inadequate is not
and cannot be tantamount to suggesting that the
answer was their cancelation.7 On the contrary, a
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, George Floyd Protests and Black Lives
Matter Roundtable (Pt. II), ARK Republic (June 14, 2020),
https://www.arkrepublic.com/2020/06/14/ark-republic-roundtable-pt-2/.
3
See, e.g., Andy Newman, Able to Save 8 Tons of Food in a Single
Day: Here Come the Food Rescurers, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/21/nyregion/food-rescuenew-york-covid.html (noting that an army of volunteers in New
York tried to make the best of an inherently wasteful grocery
system).
4
Proposed Changes to Standards 205 and 206, 303 and 508, and
507, May 7, 2021, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/may21/21-may-standards-committee-memo-proposed-changes-with-appendix.pdf; see also April
M. Barton, Teaching Lawyers to Think like Leaders: The Next
Big Shift in Legal Education 73 Baylor L. Rev. 115, 117 (2021)
(for Duquesne University Dean April M. Barton’s teaching
philosophy of leading with empathy: “Lawyers are taught to advocate, to persuade, to analyze, to parse, to spot issues, even to
convince others that they are right. These skills, while admirable,
do not always align with good leadership; in fact, if not balanced
with emotional intelligence, self-awareness, and social awareness,
these skills can defy good leadership.” (emphasis added)).
5
In the introductory chapter of an upcoming co-authored book
on Sustainable Capitalism: Contradiction in Terms or
Essential Work for the Anthropocene (Inara Scott, ed),
I develop my ideas about how a functional relationship between
a vibrant democracy and capitalism might save capitalism from
a Κρόνος (Krónos)-like future.
6
Dana Neacsu, A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and Its
Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social
Services, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405–35 (2006).
7
Id.
2

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

29

Articles

true critique ought to call for their democratic reevaluation and improvement so that they address
intersectional and systemic ills. This article wants
to dispel any lingering confusion, especially now
that a “newer left” hurries to embrace mutual aid8 in
lieu of the welfare state, which it describes as either
cold, dead, or moribund.9 Such a simplistic attitude
cannot be but a grave mistake when, globally and
historically, the only safety network that has reliably
provided for all economically vulnerable has been,
and remains, state-sponsored social services.10 This
article argues that the pandemic has only magnified
the inadequacies of institutional aid to those in
need, not its irrelevance. Faced with deepened levels
of societal vulnerability, my argument remains
the same as 15 years ago.11 Today, our troubled
American democracy needs pragmatic innovation of
steady governmental services. As researchers from
Columbia University showed, only the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act—a

A version of this paper was presented to After the Welfare State: Reconceiving Mutual Aid, The 2020 Annual
Telos-Paul Piccone Institute Conference, NYC, February
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxDT9JFuVUY.
9
See the call for papers for After the Welfare State: Reconceiving Mutual Aid, The 2020 Annual Telos-Paul Piccone
Institute Conference, NYC, February 2020.
10
See, e.g. Frank Loewenberg, From Charity to Social:
The Emergence of Communal Institutions for the
Support of the Poor in Ancient Judaism (2017) (noting a
historical example where only institutional support promotes
social justice at the level of policy, while non governmental support, often charity, perpetuates status quo and inequality).
11
Neacsu, supra note 6, at 405–35.
8
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legislative act—lifted an estimated 18 million people
out of poverty.12 No pandemic-made trillionaire
offered similar aid to the needy.13 No mutual aid
network, to my knowledge, could or did match that
level of resources.
Nevertheless, governmental services remain
inadequate with millions of Americans still in
poverty.14 In this environment, the pandemic
has cleared the path for “tax-exempt” charity or
neighborhood mutual aid networks as a welcome
band-aid. Meanwhile, as a society, we ought to
decide how to sustain our market-based, profitdriven democracy while complying with
Pam Fessler, U.S. Census Bureau Reports Poverty Rate Down,
But Millions Still Poor, NPR (September 10, 2019); Priyanka
Boghani, How COVID Has Impacted Poverty in America, PBS
(Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
covid-poverty-america/ (The Census Bureau releases poverty
figures on an annual basis with a one-year lag, so the September
figures don’t capture COVID-19 realities. When the pandemic
started, researchers at Columbia University’s Center on Poverty
& Social Policy set out to fill that gap. They began estimating
poverty in the U.S. on a monthly basis using the supplemental
poverty measure, which takes into account families’ expenses
and government assistance. The researchers put the poverty rate
in America before the crisis began at around 15 percent. Even
as COVID-19 prompted initial shutdowns in March and some
sectors of the economy ground to a halt, income tax credits for
eligible families helped offset losses, lowering the poverty rate
to 12 percent for that month. In April, the impact of record
high unemployment was blunted by a federal economic relief
package. Individuals who qualified received stimulus checks
of $1,200; married couples received $2,400; and those with
children received an additional $500 per child. People who successfully filed for unemployment received an additional $600
per week from the federal government. Columbia researchers
estimated that without the support provided by the CARES Act,
poverty in April would have jumped to 19.4 percent. With the
support, the month ended at 13.9 percent. Researchers estimated 18 million people were lifted out of poverty in April by the
federal relief package.).
13
Juliana Kaplan, Billionaires Made $3.9 trillion during the
Pandemic—Enough to Pay for Everyone’s Vaccine,
Bus. Insider (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/
billionaires-made-39-trillion-during-the-pandemic-coronavirus-vaccines-2021-1.
14
See Fessler, supra note 12 ([T]he Census Bureau found that
38.1 million people in 2018 were poor. This was 1.4 million fewer poor people than in 2017, but about one in eight Americans
still lived below the poverty line—$25,465 for a family with two
adults and two children.).
12

Neacsu: Social Services and Mutual Aid in Times of COVID-19 and Beyond: A

Vol. 25

Issue 1

Articles

30

international standards of access to basic human
rights.15

for voluntary action—and also the fastest manner of
assistance to use in times of crisis.20

I. The Pandemic Mutual Aid

Unable to face and fight the invisible enemy,
individuals, disoriented and scared, found that there
were no sufficient resources and networks to catch
the most vulnerable ones. Fear in a time of crisis is,
at first, a source of collective paralysis. Then, it
pushes people, if not governments, to organize and
help each other.21 Not a moment too soon, because
new needs, pandemic produced, demanded new and
diverse resources. For instance, as workplace
closures and self-isolation spread throughout the
country, the ordinary ways to feed the hungry
became inadequate. Thus, when informal networks
organized to meet new, specific, pandemic-created

In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic was an
unfortunate event, still far away from the American
shores. At that point, the pandemic had not impacted
our American-made reality. And then, suddenly,
within months, the COVID-19 pandemic reached
the United States. Like Christopher Columbus’ ships,
cramped and filled with an unknown illness, which
took over a vast continent and made it theirs, the
pandemic also redefined our Americas and our way
of life in ways unimaginable beforehand.16 The
institutional support of vulnerable communities
appeared inadequate.17 Globally, it is still hard to
achieve it when international organizations rate
human rights performance without poverty data.18
For instance, there are fifty countries on the
developed countries list, including the Russian
Federation and the United States, though none
provides the percent of their population living in
poverty.19 Mutual aid appears as the easy way out—
below the radar. Indeed, it is the cheapest—it asks

See, e.g., International Human Rights Law, United Nations
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://www.
ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx
(for more on basic human rights); Human Rights by Country:
United States, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Pages/USIndex.aspx (for the United States adherence to
those international instruments).
16
Dave Roos, The Ships of Christopher Columbus Were Sleek,
Fast—and Cramped, History (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.
history.com/news/christopher-columbus-ships-caravels.
17
See Disaster Financial Assistance with Food, Housing, and
Bills, USA.gov, https://www.usa.gov/disaster-help-food-housing-bills (noting that the eviction moratorium was temporary).
18
See United Nations Development Programme, Global
Human Development Indicators, http://hdr.undp.org/en/
countries.
19
Id.
15

See generally Nichole Georgeou, Neoliberalism, Development, and Aid Volunteering 10 (2012) (“Crisis” is
understood here as both a natural catastrophic event, such as
a hurricane or the COVID-19 pandemic, but also as the result
of centuries of institutional neglect of a social issue. Natural
catastrophes bring out altruism and volunteerism, “within
the realm of civil service: providing for the “needs of those
in need.’”); Diane Pien, Black Panther Party’s Free Breakfast
Program (1969-1980), BlackPast (Feb. 11, 2010), https://
www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/black-pantherpartys-free-breakfast-program-1969-1980/ (Governmental
neglect of issues, such as the hunger of black children, produced
a more organized type of vounteerism. For instance, in 1966,
the federal government initiated the School Lunch Program in
response to wide-spread poverty. Howerver it only provided
reduced-price, and not free lunches for poor children from a
few rural schools. Because hunger and poverty was affecting
black communities in urban areas, and made it difficult for
many poor black children to stay and learn in school, the Black
Panthers started the Free Breakfast Program in Okland, California, and it was open to all children enrolled.); The Dr. Huey P.
Newton Foundation, The Black Panther Party: Service
to the People Programs 30-34 (2008) (The Panthers’ Free
Breakfast Program focused national attention on the urgent
need to give poor children nutritious meals so they could be
successful in school. In 1973, this attention helped lead to
Congress’ dramatic increase in funding of the national School
Lunch Program so poor children could get free lunches. The
Panther’s Free Breakfast Program spotlighted the limited scope
of the national School Breakfast Program and helped pressure
Congress to authorize expansion of the program to all public
schools in 1975.).
21
See generally Timothy Luke, The Dawn of the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Administration of Fear and Fear of Administration
in the United States, 2020 Telos 191 (2020).
20
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wants, their success was nothing short of a miracle
for those faced with the sudden shortage of services.
For instance, in Aurora, Colorado, librarians
assembled kits of essentials for the elderly and
children who would not have access to meals,22 and
in the San Francisco Bay Area, people organized
assistance for one another.23 Similarly, in Seattle,
Washington, volunteers came together to help
undocumented people in their communities.24
The pandemic conquered the world in a few months,
borders closed, and the international flow of goods,
people, and services halted. Entire countries were
under lockdown, and this brought the global
economy to almost a standstill. The fundamental
challenges of the pandemic shook the rules that
govern our social, political, and economic lives,
exposing their inadequacy. With each day, the
pandemic challenged electoral, legislative, and
judicial processes, all while disrupting lives beyond
what was imaginable. Legal scholars shared
knowledge and insights about how law shapes
responses to—and is itself shaped by—the unfolding
crisis.25 Other scholars recorded the impromptu
networks of mutual aid that have taken over the
world.26 The press, too, has continued to bring to life
stories about this immediate outpouring of selforganized voluntarism in hopes to inspire more
action.27

Jia Tolentino, Can I Help You?, New Yorker 25 (May 18,
2020).
23
See Neacsu, supra note 6.
24
See Tolentino, supra note 22, at 25-26. In New York City, dozens of groups across all five boroughs signed up volunteers to
provide childcare and pet care, deliver medicine and groceries,
and raise money for food and rent. Relief funds were organized
for movie-theatre employees, sex workers, and street venders.
Id. Shortly before the city’s restaurants closed, on March 16th,
leaving nearly a quarter of a million people out of work, three
restaurant employees started the Service Workers Coalition,
quickly raising more than twenty-five thousand dollars to distribute as weekly stipends.
25
Katharina Pistor, Law in the Time of COVID-19 ix,
(Columbia Law School, 2020).
26
See generally Rebecca Solnit, Pandemic Solidarity:
Mutual Aid During The Covid-19 Crisis (2020).
27
See Neacsu, supra note 6.
22
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Due to the pandemic, “mutual aid” entered the
lexicon of the coronavirus era.28 Alongside “social
distancing” and “flattening the curve,” mutuality has
encapsulated a social phenomenon, and legal
narratives (like this one) brought it to center stage.
During the pandemic, mutual aid has proved
providential. But shall the question become, can
mutual aid replace everyday welfare as a sustainable
solution for the many ills of our market-based,
profit-driven, American society? The answer needs
to be a resounding no. Moreover, democratically
speaking, is it a good idea to suggest something so
akin and prone to clientelism in lieu of welfare
services?29 As insufficient and impersonal as welfare
is, it doesn’t come with that potential level of
subordination and indignity: there are no one’s
whims to negotiate.
Mutual aid services have garnered so much praise
recently as ad-hoc organizations of neighbors and
do-gooders because they are personal, and do not
threaten the dignity of those receiving them. Could
that be, perhaps ironically, because they are
temporary?30 Consequently, recipients of such
temporary services cannot and are not described
with derogatory terms like “freeloaders.”31 Moreover,
due to their contained scope, they effectively respond
to the specific vulnerability of the people they help.
They are construed to offer specific aid in times of
crisis. They also do not depend on a bureaucracy,
which runs the risks of creating delays between the
appearance of needs and their satisfaction. Provided
by ad-hoc networks of neighbors, for instance, these
services can start where they are needed almost as
soon as they are needed. They can quickly address
specific needs that are usually ignored. They provide
See generally Solnit, supra note 26.
See, e.g., Philip Keefer & Răzvan Vlaicu, Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism, 24 J. L., Econ., & Org. 371–406 (2008)
(describing political clientelism).
30
Dean Spade, Mutual Aid: Building Solidarity During
This Crisis (And The Next) 13–19 (2020).
31
Derek Thompson, Busting the Myth of ‘Welfare Makes People
Lazy,’ Atlantic (Mar. 8, 2008) (explaining the politics behind
demoralizing identifiers about the poor on welfare), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/03/welfare-childhood/555119/.
28
29
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amazing relief to victims of storms, earthquakes, and
other catastrophic events.32 It could be such specific
tasks as walking pets or rescuing victims, including
helping undergraduates lost or merely abandoned in
dormitories.33
Mutual aid projects have been successful in times of
crisis. Unfortunately, like cancer, economic
vulnerability is a chronic condition in our capitalist
democracy that requires systemic solutions to
manage it and, possibly, eradicate it. Welfare is
meant to help all individuals live with dignity, and it
achieves this by catching those who need help in a
safety net. Welfare rests on the assumption that all
citizens have a social right to a minimum standard of
living.34
Months of various degrees of isolation forced U.S.
citizens living at home and abroad to fall behind in
their usual standards of living. Travel remains a risky
prospect for many. We carry with us an invisible
enemy, COVID-19, but also a contagious lack of
leadership and a colossal lack of vision as a
government of people.35 Is it worth debating whether
to offer daily support to our most vulnerable or
whether we should charge their neighbors with that
duty? The pandemic has exposed the cracks in our
moral and social safety nets. Such services might
prove as strong as a spider’s web if we fill the safety
nets with mutual aid alone, without building
systemic support.36

Spade, supra note 30.
Id.
34
See generally Johannes Kananen, The Nordic Welfare
State in Three Eras: From Emancipation to Discipline
Need (2016).
35
See Neacsu, supra note 6.
36
E. B. White, Charlotte’s Web (1952) (a children’s novel
which tells the story of a livestock pig named Wilbur and his
friendship with a barn spider named Charlotte).
32
33
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II. Historical and Comparative
Contextualization of Welfare Services and
Mutual Aid
There is plenty of history for a comparative
contextualization to prevent uncritically embracing
mutuality. If we visualize history as pageantry and
democracy as theater, there are some well-written
scripts and strong characters.
A. A Brief View of Mutuality in American
History through the Ages
Antiquity claimed to have birthed democracy, but it
did it as a premature baby.37 Athens limited the
demos to the white male of means and thrust power
at them.38 That democracy brings to mind ours in its
pre-American Civil War embodiment, much
admired by Count de Tocqueville,39 though, like in
Athens, it ran alongside slavery and it ignored
women and children.40 It lacked welfare for all, but,
as expected, charity and mutual aid existed if for

See generally Aristotle Politics (350), Book II (disparaging democracy), or Nancy Evans, Civic Rites: Democracy
and Religion in Ancient Athens (2010).
38
Id.
39
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Eduardo
Nolla ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund 2012) (1835).
40
See, e.g., Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution (Sir Frederic G. Kenyon trans., 1903) (350 B.C.E) (“Not only was the
constitution at this time oligarchical in every respect, but the
poorer classes, men, women, and children, were the serfs of
the rich. They were known as Pelatae and also as Hectemori,
because they cultivated the lands of the rich at the rent thus
indicated. The whole country was in the hands of a few persons,
and if the tenants failed to pay their rent they were liable to be
hauled into slavery, and their children with them. All loans secured upon the debtor’s person, a custom which prevailed until
the time of Solon, who was the first to appear as the champion
of the people. But the hardest and bitterest part of the constitution in the eyes of the masses was their state of serfdom. Not
but what they were also discontented with every other feature
of their lot; for, to speak generally, they had no part nor share
in anything.”).
37
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nothing else to welcome strangers, as Ovid reminds
us in Metamorphoses.41
Democracy took center stage at the end of the
eighteenth century, during the American and French
Revolutions, with capitalism oiling its wheels.42
Whether Napoleon I crushed the budding French
democracy at the very beginning of the nineteenth
century, or put an end to the terror responsible for
its demise, is unclear.43 That temporary defeat
showcased through both its potential and limits,
whatever its version, capitalist liberal democracy
aimed at aristocratic honors, but not at privilege as
an organizing principle. The United States, too,
abhorred aristocratic privilege, although not
privileged positions in a hierarchical society.44
Unequal from its beginning, our democracy had to
embrace all types of services for the vulnerable.
Social welfare was born from a complex private and
public endeavor.45
In a society where individuals were expected to be
self-sufficient, welfare services were an anomaly.46 As
Tocqueville noted two centuries ago, each local
community was supposed to take care of their
“marginal” elements;47 probably, a minor issue not
worth institutionalizing. With their end effect—
See Ovid, Metamorphoses, Part VIII (8 AD) (This book is
telling the story of Jove and Mercury searching for hospitality
as people in need. Baucis and Philemon, an elderly couple of no
particular fame, with no wealth to speak of, welcome them, as a
stranger and his son seeking help. Baucis and Philemon lay out
all the food they have.).
42
See generally Charles Loyseau, A Treatise of Orders and
Plain Dignities (1994) (on orders and dignities in monarchist
France).
43
See, e.g., Jules Michelet, Histoire de France (1909) (for a
discussion of the Napoleonic impact on the French democracy).
44
See, e.g., De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, supra
note 39.
45
See, e.g., Social Security Admin., Historical Background
and Development of Social Security, https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html.
46
See generally Department of Veterans Affairs, VA History in
Brief, https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/
history_in_brief.pdf (regarding the vulnerable members of the
society, especially war veterans).
47
See, e.g., De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, supra
note 39.
41
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rescuing the marginal elements, welfare services
have never been an intrinsic part of the American
democratic duty, whether at the federal or local
level.48 It is only to be expected that the earliest poor
relief enacted by the American colonies and the
states assisted the disabled, the widow, and the
orphan.49 The American Civil War occasioned an
increased involvement with the federal government,
which established the Freedmen’s Bureau and a
significant expansion of voluntary effort.50 In 1862,
Congress enacted the Pension Act51 to provide
benefits to Union veterans disabled during the
conflict and their dependents.52 In 1890, the program
covered all disabilities, except old age,53 not only
war-related injuries.54
The U.S. Congress created the first federal social
welfare agency, the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen,
and Abandoned Lands, in 186555, and periodically
provided for its funding.56 Though never adequately
funded in its seven-year period of operation, the
See, e.g., Stephen Nathan Haymes, Maria Vidal De Haymes, & Reuben Jonathan Miller, The Routledge Handbook of Poverty in The United States (2015).
49
William P. Quigley, The Earliest Years of Federal Social Welfare Legislation: Federal Poor Relief Prior to the Civil War, 79 U.
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 157–88 (2002).
50
See, e.g., John K. Bardes, Redefining Vagrancy: Policing Freedom and Disorder in Reconstruction New Orleans, 1862–1868,
84 J. of Southern Hist. 69-112 (Feb. 2018) (for concrete
examples of volunteerism).
51
An Act making Appropriations for the Payment of
Invalid and other Pensions of the United States for the
Year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen hundred
and sixty-three, 12 Stat. 331, Chap. VI (Jan. 8, 1862).
52
J. W. Oliver, History of Civil War Military Pensions, 1861–
1885, 4 Bulletin of U. of Wisconsin, Hist. Series 1 (1917).
53
Congress included pensions for old age a half-a century later.
Social Security Act Pub. L. 74-271; 49 Stat. 620 (Aug. 14,
1935).
54
Id.; An act granting pensions to soldiers and sailors
who are incapacitated for the performance of manual
labor, and providing for pensions to widows, minor
children, and dependent parents, 26 Stat. 182, Chap. 634
(June 27, 1890).
55
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, 13 Stat. 507, Chap. 90 (Mar. 3,
1865).
56
Command of the Army Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 485, Chap.
170.
48
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Bureau provided direct relief to former slaves in their
transition to freedom.57 It also provided educational,
medical, and legal services to the destitute.58
In the aftermath of the American Civil War, the need
for social services was so acute that in addition to
government-sponsored services and numerous
voluntary social welfare programs, a new type of
organization appeared, combining public and private
money.59 The nation’s first major public health
organization—the U.S. Sanitary Commission was a
public-private agency created by federal legislation in
1861 to support sick and wounded soldiers during
the American Civil War, which enlisted thousands of
volunteers.60 Subsequently, much of its work would
be provided by the American Red Cross, a charity
founded by Clara Barton in 1881.61
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, mutual aid thrived alongside social
welfare, and millions of Americans received benefits
from their fraternal or “sororal” societies. In the late
nineteenth century, the three main fraternal types
were secret societies, sick and funeral benefit
societies, and life insurance societies.62 By 1920, one
in three adult males belonged to one of these
societies. Furthermore, ethnic societies provided
more assistance than other institutions, “public or
private, [which] were only viewed as a last resort.”63

For a history of the Bureau’s activity, see generally Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution,
1863-1877 (2014).
58
M.E. Titzel, Building A Child Welfare Program In Wartime, 24
Am. J. Socio. 411–22 (1919).
59
Clara Barton, The Red Cross in Peace and War (American Historical Press ed. 1906).
60
See, e.g., U.S. Sanitary Commission: 1861, VCU Libraries:
Social Welfare Hist. Project (2013), https://socialwelfare.
library.vcu.edu/programs/health-nutrition/u-s-sanitary-commission-1861/.
61
Barton, supra note 59.
62
David T. Beito, From Mutual Aid to the Welfare State:
Fraternal Societies and Social Services, 1890–1967
(2000).
63
Id. at 2.
57
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In this very complex environment of inadequate
services, to exclusively rely on mutuality at first
appears ideological rather than practical.
Postcolonial neoliberal solutions seem to unite as
government institutions collapse and private
corporatist alternatives are encouraged to flourish.64
These solutions appear to be the antidote to the, by
now, puny welfare bureaucrats65 and blindly
promoted mutual aid enters as the savior.66
Uncritically endorsed, it might provide the capital to
normalize the most wrongs in the most insidious and
injurious way. Low-income families are expected to
provide necessary assistance for each other without
institutional help.67 Poor countries, with riches
depleted by colonial exploitation, are now left to
organize, resolve the damage and heal from the
exploitation. There is little infrastructure in place to
help fix the inherited wrongs, while the rich and the
haves are further insulated within their kinship
networks.68
Ideologically speaking, mutuality seems to fit our
American society better. Whether liberal or neoliberal, our domestic policies have promoted a
market-based economic development and growth
strategy as the obvious solution to alleviating
poverty, affecting approaches to the problem
discursively, politically, economically, culturally, and
experientially.69 However, rather than alleviating
poverty, this increased market-based approach has
exacerbated poverty and pre-existing inequalities.70
Deregulation and privatization of social welfare
services align them closely to mutual aid funding and
with the transformation of the liberal state from a
benevolent one to a punitive police-watch state.71
Criminalizing poor women, racial and ethnic
See, e.g., Haymes et al., supra note 48.
See, e.g., Neacsu, supra note 5, at 405–35.
66
See, e.g., Spade, supra note 30.
67
See, e.g., How the Poor Help Each Other, 55 N.Y. Evangelist 6
(Jan. 17, 1884).
68
See generally Prabhu Kandachar, Sustainability Challenges and Solutions at the Base of the Pyramid: Business, Technology and the Poor (2008).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Neacsu, supra note 6, at 405–35.
64
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minorities, and immigrants have been conducive to
the increasing poverty levels.72 On the contrary,
Canadian welfare originated from a different
ideology: welfare services are a governmental duty,
not an individual option.73 For instance, when
remuneration from employment is inadequate,
including old age and disability pensions, state-based
welfare steps in with unemployment insurance, paid
employment leave for new parents, state-funded
health insurance, and publicly funded education and
job training.74
Individualism extolled, it makes sense that people
avoided government aid at all cost. Moreover, during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all
the aid for the poor, whether it came from the
government or organized charities, “was not only
minimal but carried great a stigma.”75 Americans
seemed more comfortable relying first on fraternal
societies.76 These societies, smaller in scope,
addressed their members’ cultural, psychological,
and gender needs. They also addressed these needs
holistically: “In contrast to the hierarchical methods
of public and private charity, fraternal aid rested on
an ethical principle of reciprocity. Donors and
recipients often came from the same, or nearly the
same, walks of life; today’s recipient could be
tomorrow’s donor, and vice versa.”77
Though in demand, these services were highly
unstable because they depended on membership
dues, and with the increase in joblessness in the
Depression era, their effectiveness ebbed as demand
increased.78 For instance, some three in four families
had to let some or all insurance policies and other
membership benefits lapse. A lapsed member of a
Black society in Mississippi summarized a recurrent

See, e.g., Haymes, et. al., supra note 48.
See generally Paul H. Stuart et al., Encyclopedia of Social Welfare History in North America (2005).
74
Id.
75
Quigley, supra note 49, at 233.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
72
73
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fraternal complaint: “People got no work. How are
they [going to] pay dues when they [can’t] eat?”79
Compounding on these issues, the U.S. Supreme
Court also demonstrated its lack of empathy for the
poor, by acknowledging only the “narrowest
constitutional grounds for addressing their
interests.”80 While the nation was figing the War on
Poverty, the Supreme Court was making its 1970
contribution. 81 In Dandridge v. Williams, the Court
held that 250 U.S. dollars per month was an absolute
public assistance grant limit, regardless of the size of
the family and its actual need, and it did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.82 Dandridge is only one of many of
these types of “corrective justice” cases.83
B. A Brief Comparative View of Mutuality in
the 20th Century
Ironically, in the aftermath of World War II (WWII),
Western liberal democracies relied on American help
to build their welfare states.84 The United States
engaged in that endeavor at the expense of walling
off their eastern, more vulnerable neighbors in one
police state after another. Subsequently described as
paternalistic, the liberal welfare state soon became
disparaged as such.85
On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State
George C. Marshall delivered a speech
to the graduating class at Harvard
University. In the speech, Marshall
Id.
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our
Helplessness, 79 Geo. L.J. 1499, 1509 (1991).
81
For various financial federal allocations for state administered
projects, see, generally United States. Office of Economic
Opportunity, War on Poverty Projects (1965).
82
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
83
See, e.g., Neacsu, supra note 6, at 420 (discussing Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987)).
84
Scott Parrish, The Marshall Plan, Soviet-American Relations,
and the Division of Europe, in The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 267 (Norman
Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii ed., 2018).
85
See, e.g., Julian Le Grand & Bill New, Government Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend? (2015) (for a
history of welfare).
79
80
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made a dramatic offer of large-scale
American economic aid to help in the
reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe .
. . Despite increasing tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union
over the postwar European order, the
offer of aid was not restricted to any
particular set of countries; Marshall
welcomed the participation of “any
country that is willing to assist in the
task of recovery.” After some initial
hesitation, however, the Soviet Union
rejected the American proposal,
and coerced its Eastern European
neighbors into following suit. [. . .] The
Marshall Plan thus seems to have been
a watershed in the development of the
Cold War.86
The division of Europe into two competing blocs,
each led by one of the emergent superpowers, was
likely the result of aid distribution.87 Western
liberalism broadened the specter of individual
rights, enlivening the discourse about the haves
and the have-nots and working on social safety-net
structures. 88 The liberal welfare state made its first
appearance, too.89
In order to avoid being crushed by Soviet tanks
and following the demands of the post-war
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Donald Sassoon, The Rise and Fall of West European
Communism 1939-48, 1 Contemp. European Hist. 139 (1992)
(for more on the role of foreign aid in the history of Western
Europe).
88
See, e.g., Michael Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally:
The Incoherence of Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and
Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 U. Mo.—
Kansas City L. Rev. 733-90 (2001) (for an in-depth discussion
about the impact of international liberalism on haves and have
nots).
89
See, e.g., David G. Mayes & Anna Michalski, The Changing Welfare State in Europe: The Implications for Democracy (2013)(for an in-depth discussion about the impact
of international liberalism on haves and have nots); Walter I.
Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State: A History of
Social Welfare in America (1974) (describing a brief history
of welfare in America).
86
87
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international order,90 countries east of Berlin
kneeled and kissed the hand of their Russian
godfather.91 By 1947, the Eastern European states—
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Romania—were fully Sovietized.92 Their
oligarchies were not monolithic, and neither were
their identifiers: dictatorship of the proletariat,
Socialist Republic, or People’s Republic.93 In reality,
as it turned out, both eastern and western
democracies shareed a similar prosperity goal:
building a oligarchy94 acceptable by their people.
Both went too far—the Berlin Wall was toppled on
November 9, 198995—though in the West, the top
one percent seem to continue to enjoy some
popularity from their economic stratosphere.96
Without a doubt, the upper echelon of eastern
nomenclature—the height of the Soviet
bureaucracy—enjoyed much less than their
western counterparts.97 Perhaps, in hindsight, that
explains the implosion of that system and the

See, e.g., Antony Best, International History of the
Twentieth Century (2004).
91
Id.
92
Parrish, supra note 84.
93
See Leonid Gibianskii, The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the
Cominform, in The Establishment of Communist Regimes
in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 291 (Norman Naimark and
Leonid Gibianskii ed., 2018) (There were clear differences of
subordination and freedom in the Eastern Bloc, with Tito’s
Yugoslavia occupying one of the highest ranks.).
94
See generally Anders Åslund, How Capitalism Was Built:
The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe,
Russia, and Central Asia (2007) (on Soviet and post-Soviet
capitalism); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century (2014) (arguing that rising inequality has been the
historical nor in each society).
95
Libray of Congress, The Rise and Fall of the Berlin
Wall (Nov. 1, 2019) https://blogs.loc.gov/international-collections/2019/11/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-berlin-wall/.
96
Kerry A. Dolan et al., Forbes World’s Billionaires List: The
Richest in 2021, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#549ef44e251c (“Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk have reached
the stratosphere—with each rocket man amassing more than
$150 billion. Here, a timeline of their journey to the top.”)
97
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, Romania, Bulgaria, The United States
and the European Union: The Rules of Empowerment at the
Outskirts of Europe, 30 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 185, 188 (2004).
90
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willingness of their oligarchs to join the liberal,
market-based system.98

on the black market to the nomenclature’s closeknit kinship networks.107

Behind the Iron Curtain, through time and
tremendous individual sacrifice,99 Soviet Russia
and its acolytes (more accurately, hostages),100
improved the level of collective socio-economic
well-being. Through nationalization, planification,
and cooperativization, all Soviet countries
achieved various levels of socio-economic
accomplishments.101 By the time of Stalin’s death in
1953, the horrors of WWII had been contained,
and every Russian enjoyed a minimum amount of
consumer goods.102 The 1970s produced
unparalleled social and economic progress in all
developing (socialist) countries. 103 In parallel with
this process, perhaps recognizing the minimal level
of success of these policies, all these systems based
on surveillance, falsehood, and propaganda
encouraged a type of mutual aid patronage.104 This
proto-networking was based on loyalty,
nepotism,105 or strong connections akin to
kinship.106 Each social-economic stratum created
its own ad-hoc cultural clubs, from neighbors
sharing movies, books, or music tapes purchased

Thirty years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, all of
these horizontal networks and associations
continue.108 Some might say that the practice of
clientelism—a type of mutual aid—encouraged
corruption and constituted a major cause in the fall
of the soviet system.109 Consequently, this legacy of
kinship-based corruption was seen as a major
obstacle to the development of viable democratic
and market institutions110 because systemic
corruption undermines the rule of law, which is
crucial for democracy and a market economy.111
One might even speculate that the Iron Curtain
had to fall to allow the rich of the West and East to
enjoy the other’s company openly.112 For instance,
the current dictator of the former Soviet Republic
of Kazakhstan, is Nursultan Nazarbayev, a former
high-level member of the politburo.113 Today, he is
a billionaire.114 His privileges as a high level
politician in a Soviet system could never compare
with the opportunities presented by the free
market.

Id.
99
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, History as Advocacy? That Takes
the Prize (Gulag: A History), 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 213-31
(2004).
100
See generally Norman Naimark & Leonid Gibianskii, The
Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe,
1944–1949 (2018).
101
Id.
102
Ernest Block, The Soviet Welfare State, 186 Contemp. Rev.
44, 45 (Jul. 1, 1954).
103
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The History of UNCTAD 1964-1984 7 (1985), https://
unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osg286_en.pdf.
104
See generally David L. Hoffmann, Cultivating the
Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism,
1914–1939 (2011).
105
Timothy K. Blauvelt, Clientelism and Nationality in
an Early Soviet Fiefdom (2011).
106
Id.
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Despite coups and televised revolutions, social
networks have proven unshakeable in the former
Soviet states.115 The poor have survived with family
See, e.g., Geoffrey Pridham, Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and
Eastern Europe 58–82 (1996) (for a review of how nomenclature became the upper class).
108
See, e.g., Christoph H. Stefes, Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion and Clientelism (2006).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, Romania, Bulgaria, The United States
and the European Union: The Rules of Empowerment at the
Outskirts of Europe, 30 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 185, 188 (2004).
113
Nursultan-Nazarbayev, Britannica, https://www.britannica.
com/biography/Nursultan-Nazarbayev.
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Id.
115
Dana Mustata, The Revolution Has Been Televised… Television as Historical Agent in the Romanian Revolution, 10 J.
Modern European Hist. 76 (2012).
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help: the young emigrate, work abroad, and send
financial support to family members left behind.116
Also, those at the top of the social ladder have
preserved and consolidated their positions, in part
because of the built-in system of trust,117 but also
because the European Union (EU) has recognized
and promoted those soviet oligarchic structures of
privilege.118 Thus, the top one percent of the
ideologically despised dictatorships have
successfully metamorphosized into the top one
percent of the ideologically correct new EU state
members’ representatives. Internationally, we can
talk about successful mutual aid among the equally
situated.119
Mutuality is not a pandemic invention. As
discussed here, it has existed across geopolitical
borders, societies, and also throughout history,
both as an expedient way to deal with social
wrongs for those affected by them, and those
supposed to manage them. Athens knew it.120
Medieval Europe knew it as trade guilds, churches,
and the kings’ courts.121 In every historical period,
mutual aid among kinship of sorts thrived.122 But,
when successful, they seem to have encouraged
See, e.g., Anca Alexe, Romania’s emigrant population is the
fifth largest in the world and growing, OECD report finds, Bus.
Rev.(July 16, 2019), https://business-review.eu/news/romanias-emigrant-population-is-the-fifth-largest-in-the-world-andgrowing-oecd-report-finds-203223.
117
See generally Yuliy Nisnevich, Regeneration of the nomenclature as a ruling social stratum in the post-soviet Russia, 8
Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia 143 (2018).
118
See, e.g., Denica Yotova, Bulgaria’s anti-corruption protests
explained – and why they matter for the EU, Eur. Council
on Foreign Rel. (July 28, 2020), https://www.ecfr.eu/article/
commentary_bulgarias_anti_corruption_protests_explained_
and_why_they_matter (For instance, European leaders have
stood by as Bulgarians demand real reform on corruption. Such
silence will only harm the EU in the long run.).
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., T. D. Robinson, Ancient Poor Laws: An Inquiry
as to the Orovisions for the Poor of Judea, Athens, and
Rome (1836).
121
See, e.g., Elmo Borges Koch et al., The Guild Concept: From
Feudalism to Community Ecology, Acta Biológica Colombiana 38 (2019).
122
Id.
116
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some form of clientelism.123 Far from a sign of
progress, kinship, mutuality, and mutual aid are
not signs of a vibrant liberal economy.124 They
often start as a genuine form of horizontal help at
the very bottom of the social ladder, signaling a
lack or failure of any institutional support. The
higher we go, mutuality either resemble a quidpro-quod network of like-minded, equally situated,
individuals or a form of hierarchically organized
patronage. Globally, indicative of a society in
trouble and lacking leadership, these networks
seem to create its new social stratification.125
Mutuality, as a socio-economic and political
phenomenon, has both preceded and co-existed
with democratic governments.126 That is because
democracy, an imperfect political tool for
Aristotle,127 and often questioned by the American
voter at the voting booth every two and four years,
stands on many interests and struggles to represent
them.128 However, its main characteristic is its aim
for a type of plurality, uniformity and normalcy, a
minimum of decency for all. To that end, the
welfare state has been its more reliable source. To
the contrary, mutual aid signals a shift away from
state-sponsorphip, from bureaucratic to
decentralized help, and given the raging inequality
COVID-19 has produced, its result is far from
predictable.129 Such a societal retreat might further
threaten the American liberal democracy, whose
seeds were planted during the American Civil War
See Luke, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Kelly M. McMann, Corruption as a last resort: adapting to the market in Central Asia (2014).
125
See generally Stefes, supra note 81.
126
See generally Benito Li Vigni Cosa Nostra,
Cosa di Stato: storia delle collusioni tra mafia e
istituzioni dalle origini ai giorni nostri (2015) (for a
history of one of the most successful mutuality aid societies
resulting from the democratic Italian government’s catastrophic
failure to deal with the systemic poverty of the South).
127
Fred Miller, Aristotle’s Political Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ (noting that “Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution”).
128
See id. (Aristotle preferring polity to democracy).
129
See, e.g., Dolan et. al., supra note 96.
123
124

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4

39

Articles

and blossomed only after implementing the
expanded Bill of Rights. That expansion was aided
by FDR’s welfare state130, Johnson’s War on
Poverty131, and a liberal democracy whose scope
created a minimum, uniform standard of living,
equal rights, and equal opportunities.132
Of course, crises happen, and their magnitude
seems to be on the rise due to climate change and
now COVID-19. One may say that crises are now
periodical, which only further strengthens my
argument that we need to rely on systemic
solutions, rather than on ad-hoc, improvisations.
Our democracy cannot regard poverty and
vulnerable populations as if we were talking about
New York City restaurants building sheds in the
street to cope with inside restrictions.133 Liberal
democracies have created some expectation of
individual well-being where the community’s wellbeing supports individuality. Democracies demand
stability, not temporary, band-aid solutions.

Vol. 25

Liberal capitalism incorporates public and private
services134 and, despite its flaws, the liberal welfare
democracy has the best record of protecting those
in need.135 Critiques aside, privatizing welfare
services might bolster our dedication to capitalism
and its blind belief in the market and private
property.136 It might temporarily improve their
quality and delivery, but the record is inconsistent
at best: here we are arguing to improve government
services because volunteerism has not solved any
systemic ills.137 Additionally, mutual aid networks
did not save the Soviet system either. True, the
Soviet approach to individualism and racial
inequality proved catastrophic,138 but the
neoliberal welfare state proves equally oblivious to
cultural and racial intersectionality.139 More to the
point, the liberal welfare state is differently
conceived from the soviet state. The latter doled
out wages and pensions like the monopolist in
charge it was. On the contrary, the liberal welfare
system relies on the Rule of Law limiting the
impact of monopolies and governmental duty to
provide for its most vulnerable, to the extent

Benjamin Holtzman, The Long Crisis: New York City
and the Path to Neoliberalism (2021). (The Long Crisis explores the origins and implications of one of the most
significant developments across the globe over the last fifty
years: the diminished faith in government as capable of solving
public problems. Conventional accounts of the shift toward
market and private sector governing solutions have focused
on the rising influence of conservatives, libertarians, and the
business sector. To the contrary this book locates the origins of
this transformation in the postwar efforts to preserve liberalism. When the city government could not provide services,
rather than revolt, New Yorkers, organized. Through block
associations, nonprofits, and professional organizations, they
embraced an ethos of private volunteerism and, eventually, of
partnership with private business in order to save their communities from neglect.).
135
See generally J.F. Sleeman, The Welfare State. Its Aims,
Benefits and Costs (1973) (for a survey of the British welfare
state).
136
Holtzman, supra note 134.
137
Id.
138
Joshua Yaffa, Letter from Moscow: Exiled. The Vanishing of an
American Radical. The New Yorker 26–31 (Oct. 25, 2021).
139
Spade, supra note 30.
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See generally Paul Keith Conkin. FDR and the Origins
of the Welfare State (1967).
131
See generally David Zarefsky. President Johnson’s War
on Poverty: Rhetoric and History (1986).
132
See generally Paul K. Conkin, FDR and the Origins of
the Welfare State (1967); David Zarefsky, President
Johnson’s war on poverty: Rhetoric and History (1986)
(for more on welfare policies).
133
See, e.g., Kate Krader et al., NYC Restaurants Rush Toward
Reopening With Grim 25% Math in Mind, Bloomberg (Feb. 11,
2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-11/
nyc-restaurants-scramble-to-reopen-cope-with-economic-hardship; see also Valeria Ricciulli, Streeteries. Is It Really an OpenAir Restaurant If It Has Walls and a Roof ? N.Y. Mag. (Nov. 2,
2020), https://www.curbed.com/2020/11/nyc-outdoor-diningwinter-open-restaurants-cabins.html (describing their inadequate, temporary nature).
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possible, while also promoting capitalist
individualism.140 So far, it has delivered basic
services for all with various degrees of success,
especially abroad.141
For decades, my writing has focused on rethinking
and reimagining the role of law and legal
scholarship in terms of social dignity. While vocally
critical of the welfare services, mutual aid has
never seemed a viable democratic solution to
systemic problems.142 As such, my steadfast support
for state-based services for the liberal welfare state
has only increased during our social, moral, and
healthcare pandemics. This essay argues that a
choice between public and private services, while
ideologically quaint for the supporters of
privatization, is a catastrophic choice for any
democratic state built on steep economic
inequality, such as our American democracy. That
we can even imagine this contentious choice only
means that the ideology143 behind them is
meaningfully divisive: one considers the
government as the potential solution, while the
other ignores the government altogether.
The position that welfare resonates with socialism,
and socialism resonates with the Soviet
paternalistic state should be put to rest by the
above analysis.144 If this is the reason for attacking
See generally John Vickers & Vincent Wright, The Politics of Privatisation in Western Europe (1989) (Western
European countries are very much aware of the dangers of
privatizing public services in public sectors, and thus mindful
of what is open to privatization and its dangers.).
141
See ABA, supra note 4.
142
See, e.g., Mark Weiner, Toward a Critical Theory of Emergency Medical Services: Solidarity, Sovereignty, Temporality (Telos,
forthcoming 2021) (Of course, I am aware of exceptional
services communities provide for their members on a voluntary
basis, such as emergency services, but all seem limited in scope
and geography.)
143
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, The Bourgeois Charm of Karl
Marx & the Ideological Irony of American Jurisprudence 72–117 (2020) (using ideology as the subjectivity defining the self within the public sphere, within their encounter
with the public organization of power); Pistor, supra note 25,
at 113–17 (describing liberalism as an ideology).
144
See supra text and footnotes.
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the liberal welfare state, then mutuality should be
distrusted because, as shown here, it thrived in
soviet times, too, as it thrives in any non-capitalist
society: the poor help each other.145 More
interestingly, the rich stick together, too. In the
United States, the rich drive the Congressional
agenda, so taxing the rich is invariably turned into
tax exemptions for the rich.146 Also, internationally,
the top one percent stay connected in ideologically
supportive, mutual support networks.147 Given
such a potential confusion and ambiguity, this
article will complement the comparative
germination and the historical intersection of
welfare services and mutuality with a brief review
of their most recent past in the United States, in
hopes to better guide future decision-making.
III. U.S. Welfare and Mutual
Aid—The Last Three Decades
With all its inherent limitations mentioned earlier,
U.S. federal welfare programs continued to grow
through the latter part of the twentieth century
until the Clinton presidency, notably 1996.148
After which, the official narrative embraced the
Republican view of poverty as an individual
choice. It took Republicans decades of hard work
and indoctrination of both the academe and
governmental employees, who attended either
the Chicago University and absorbed Nobel
Prize laureate Milton Friedman’s ideas about the
government being the problem as inefficient,149
or who absorbed the more pernicious libertarian
See, e.g., C.M. Hann, Socialism Ideals, Ideologies, and
Local Practice 1–18 (1994) (for an in-depth explanation of
how “sharing” works in the Bushmen society in Africa, as well
as in any non-capitalist society).
146
See generally Mark Zepezauer, Take the Rich off Welfare (1996); James T. Bennett, Corporate Welfare: Crony
Capitalism that Enriches the Rich (2015).
147
See, e.g., Kerry A. Dolan et al., Forbes World’s Billionaires
List: The Richest in 2021, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/#549ef44e251c (Chinese and Russian billionaires top
the list of the world’s richest.).
148
See generally R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare as We
Know It (2000) (analyzing the Clinton administration welfare
policy).
149
See generally Milton Friedman, Tax Limitation, Inflation and the role of Government (1978).
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ideas of another Nobel Prize laureate James McGill
Buchanan about reshaping the government’s
role into a night watch state to protect the rich.150
Buchanan’s language was aimed at the Right-wing
elites; it is cryptic in its reliance on changing
personal behavior, but the goal is the same: the
state has no role when it comes to personal choice,
and poverty is such a choice, ergo, welfare should
be limited or eliminated. Buchanan notes that:
We must acknowledge that the bloated
welfare transfer state that we now
live with was allowed to grow in the
shadow of the Cold War over the half
century and without attention to its
own external diseconomies. Belatedly,
in the 1990s, reforms everywhere
have been initiated that are aimed
at reducing the relative weight of
the public sector overall, or at least
reducing its rate of growth.151
Ironically, welfare was to blame for creating
a particular type of behavior, dependency,
rather than the opposite: respite to recollect
and strategize. Buchanan viewed morality in
eliminating financial support.152
These reforms proceed under varying
names—privatization,
devolution,
subsidiarity, decentralization—some
of which have been discussed in earlier
sessions. At this point, I must shift the
focus of my argument. I have suggested
variously that the fundamental issues
facing modern societies are moral,
and that institutional reforms have an

James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The calculus
of consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional
Democracy (2004).
151
James M. Buchanan, & Richard A. Musgrave, Public
Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of
the State 217 (1999) (Buchanan’s address).
152
Id.
150
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influence in changing attitudes and
patterns of behavior.153
So did the Republican Congress the Clinton
Administration.154 Then, the academic, and
mediatic description of welfare as “government
clientelism”—disparaging Democrats supporting
welfare services as a way to obtain votes from those
on welfare155—reached its peak. The Republicandominated Congress passed legislation to replace
cash support for those in need as long they were
in need, with temporary assistance for those
who, misguided, took a wrong turn in life.156
Republicans in Congress successfully painted their
governing failure as a person’s choice incorporating
Buchanan’s personal choice views.157 By joyfully
employing racial slurs and racializing

Id.
See discussion in this section.
155
See generally Susan C. Stokes, Political Clientelism, Oxford
Handbook of Political Science (2011) (for more on clientelism).
156
See Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Policy Basics:
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, https://www.
cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/temporary-assistance-for-needy-families (In 1996, the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which provided cash assistance to
families with children experiencing poverty. Due to the type of
assistance, “the caseloads have fallen.”).
157
See generally Nancy MacLean, Democracy in chains:
The Deep History of the Radical right’s stealth plan
for America (2017); Lynn Paramore, Meet the Hidden
Architect Behind America’s Racist Economics, Inst. for New
Econ. Thinking (May 30, 2018) (“Buchanan’s ideas began to
have huge impact, especially in America and in Britain. In his
home country, the economist was deeply involved in efforts
to cut taxes on the wealthy in 1970s and 1980s and he advised
proponents of Reagan Revolution in their quest to unleash
markets and posit government as the “problem” rather than the
“solution.” The Koch-funded Virginia school coached scholars,
lawyers, politicians, and business people to apply stark rightwing perspectives on everything from deficits to taxes to school
privatization. In Britain, Buchanan’s work helped to inspire the
public sector reforms of Margaret Thatcher and her political
progeny.”).
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of poverty, Republican legislators ended welfare
as Americans knew it.158 The public imagination
was suffused with “the myth of the welfare mother
with a Cadillac.”159 Its prevalence was so pervasive
that then-U.S. Democratic President Bill Clinton
became a mere pawn in the destruction of the
welfare system.160 Gilman notes that:
The “welfare queen” was shorthand
for a lazy woman of color, with
numerous children she cannot
support, who is cheating taxpayers
by abusing the system to collect
government assistance. For years, this
long-standing racist and gendered
stereotype was used to attack the poor
and the cash assistance programs that
support them. In 1996, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
capped welfare receipt to five years
and required work as a condition of
eligibility, thus stripping the welfare
queen of her throne of dependency.161
Ironically, earlier I hailed legislation for its role
in the creation of welfare, only to note now that
less than a century later, legislation curtailed it.
Like magic, the lack of welfare produced a drop
in the number of people on welfare. America’s
poverty problem seemed solved! Once the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996162 was passed, the
nation’s welfare caseload dropped by fifteen
percent within the first few years. Public funding

See generally R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare as We
Know It (2000) (analyzing the Clinton administration welfare
policy).
159
Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22
Am. U. J. Gender, Soc., Pol. & L. 247, 247 (2014).
160
See generally Neacsu, supra note 6.
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Gilman, supra note 159; see also Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-Poverty Discourse, 25 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J., 257, 258 (2016).
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
158

Articles

42

was cut by $54 billion U.S. dollars within the first
six years of the program.163 But unlike Johnson’s
War on Poverty, which reduced the nation’s
poverty rate from eighteen percent to nine percent
in 1972, poor people became worse off under
President Clinton’s Act.164
But perhaps the worse social engineering of
the 1996 welfare reform was the Charitable
Choice provision, which authorized faithbased organizations to compete with secular
organizations to provide federally funded welfare,
health, and social services.165 This provision,
which the next administration—that of then-U.S.
President George W. Bush—quickly embraced,
allowed faith-based organizations to retain their
religious character while providing social services
so long as it did not diminish the recipients’
religious freedom.166 Thus, we started the
twenty-first century tolerating welfare services.
When the government cut short its direct public
assistance programs, choosing instead to subsidize
religious organizations’ social activities, the shift
from poverty as a societal ailment to poverty as
an individual choice was complete. The poor
were now “undeserving.” Once that happens,
University of Pittsburgh Law Professor Thomas
Ross reminds us, society easily stops funding
services for the disadvantaged.167 Once the label
of undeserving poor creeps into popular belief,
it becomes very difficult to perceive poverty
accurately, as originating in “the structure of
America’s political economy”—not in the behavior
of the poor, who are often described as deviant,
criminal, and “beyond hope and [without] any
sense of initiative.”168 Undeserving and having
chosen to be poor, society loses interest in finding
a systemic cure for poverty.169 When this occurs,
See Neacsu, supra note 6, at 419.
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Ross, supra note 79, at 1509; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 486 (1970).
168
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public assistance programs become secondary, and
private charities receive first billing.170
Charities, organizations described in Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, comprise
of both public charities and private foundations.171
They mimic corporations, and historically, have
engaged in grant-making activities, as well as direct
service activities.172 The donors are encouraged to
give through various tax schemes, and some give.173
However, it does not seem democratically
wise to make the poor depend on the generosity of
some.174 Such a scheme rather than welfare might
be perceived as disparaging and dispirited or even
encouraging feudalism and its power structure.
Charities, sometimes better organized than mutual
aid networks, are not meant to replace public
assistance.175 Their natural commitments are not to
provide for the poor to resolve a systemic problem
but to provide specifically for the poor whose
stories resonate with the charities’ mission.176 So,
what is left for the poor? Absent a welfare-building
Left, then, volunteerism, charities, mutual aid
societies, and religious organizations are their only
options.177 As shown here, mutuality is a temporary
successful solution in a society whose services for
the vulnerable are missing,178 but it can perennially
complement well organized institutional
services.179 Most of the time, it is an academically
flimsy, ideological expedient.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 501 (2019).
172
See generally Neacsu, supra note 6.
173
See, e.g., Charles Koch Foundation, https://charleskochfoundation.org/; Open Society Foundations, https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/george-soros.
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Harvey P. Dale & Jill S. Manny, Social Welfare Organizations:
Better Alternatives to Charities?, 21 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y
337, 340 (2018).
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(2008).
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For instance, mutuality thrives on the premise that
people have commitments and responsibilities
toward each other.180 But those commitments reach
only a flimsy layer; they are not contingent on what
the government is or is not doing to redistribute
resources and lessen material inequalities. Philip
Selznick, Sociology Professor at the University
of California at Berkeley supports individual
responsibilities arising from social involvements
and commitments.181 Simnulatenously, he clarifies
that the responsibilities that people have as
parents, neighbors, and citizens are not equal,
because they stem from different sources.182 As a
result, Selznick imposes meager societal duties on
the affluent members. 183 The responsibilities of the
affluent are limited to establishing baseline equality
of condition. Mutuality implies an affluent society
that does not leave its masses unaccounted for.184
In another view of mutualism, that of the British
school of mutualism, it is contingent on group
behavior.185 “More broadly, establishing social
relations based on mutual regard is at best more
difficult and at worst impossible in the context
of gross disparities on income and wealth.”186
Nevertheless, even when conditional, the British
mutualist case recognizes its minimal chances
of success if made in isolation from the broader
questions of social and economic justice. Without a
minimum level of nurture, there is no opportunity
for the poor. Moreover, their caregivers will
fail if the need to balance work and care makes
impossible demands upon their resources, however
committed they may be.187 Finally, to succeed, as
the British scholarship clarifies, mutualism needs
a society built on social responsibility, so it is not
a crutch for a limping person, but a bouquet of
flowers for someone well cared for:
Id., at 136–37.
Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth: Social
Theory and the Promise of Community (1992).
182
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The most compelling statement of
why equality matters for community is
still one the British Christian Socialist
Richard Tawney made. As a Christian,
Tawney started from the premise that
all are entitled to equality of respect
by virtue of their common relationship with the Creator. Such equality of
respect, Tawney argued, was “incompatible with the existence of sharp contrasts between economic standards and
educational opportunities of different
classes.” For Tawney, the “fact of human fellowship [should not be] obscured by economic contrasts,” and a
good society is one that uses its “material resources to promote the dignity and refinement of the individual
human beings who compose it.” Thus,
because mutualism starts with a deeper concept of social responsibility, it
also sets higher demands on both the
recipients of aid, and the society that
offers it.188
Mutual aid exerts a certain ideological attraction in
societies with a strong welfare system, beyond the
dislike of government. It is connected to the nature
of duty, responsibility, and mutual obligation.189 For
instance, Janet Finch (mentioned in the forward)
and renowned British feminist scholar Gillian Dalley
focused on the morality of care.190 Their main question is the search for “Where does the responsibility
for providing care [. . .] lie?”191 Their Holy Grail is
that “society as a whole should take responsibility for
its weaker members.”192 For them, this principle of
collective responsibility can naturally lead to different and more collective forms of services provided

Mead & Beem, supra note 179.
See generally Gillian Dalley, Ideologies of Caring: Rethinking Community and Collectivism (1988).
190
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Id. at ix.
192
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188
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in such a manner that it preserves the agency of the
people who need care.193
Dalley’s book incorporates studies on hybrid services
using horizontal and vertical structures.194 The nature
of duty is Dalley’s explanation, but Dalley fails to
prove that mutual aid breeds social empathy and ethical behavior beyond its horizontal reach.195 Vertically, as history has shown, it is much more likely
to breed clientelism or patronage, and from a moral
point of view, hypocrisy.196
Thus, when the “Newer” and leaner left is engaged
in dismissing the welfare state as some sort of dinosaur and passionately promoting mutuality, the two
services shine in their striking difference. By asking
the academe or the public to make a choice, this
“Newer” and leaner left is actually losing currency
because it appears unfocused, unprepared, and not
ready to help the poor. And then, the real question
becomes: is any American government interested in
assuring compliance with international human rights
standards?
IV. Concluding Remarks: Dare to Think
Pragmatically, Realistically
Today’s choice cannot be either welfare or
mutuality, but compliance with the international
standards established by international instruments
for human rights.197 Enlarging the scope of social
services’ deliverance would conceptually help
scholars and politicians acknowledge that welfare
services and voluntarism have worked side by
side for most of the world’s history, including our
republic’s. There is a place for innovation. Public
and private social services are needed because our
American liberal democracy condones deep socioeconomic inequality and vulnerability remains a
human condition. From the brief examination of
these services, it is apparent that a makeover would
improve both their scope and delivery.
Id.
Dalley, supra note 189.
195
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196
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Finding solutions to systemic problems caused by
endemic racism, socio-economic inequality, and
various forms of societal discrimination requires
as many informed participants as possible. This
requires reliable channels of information and
means to neutralize disinformation. Voters have
enjoyed infotainment for too long, and have
traveled considerably from late-night comedy
shows satirizing the news cycle through the prism
of “fake news”—real in its premise, “fake” in its
outcome—as a scathing criticism of our political
complacency, 198 to alternative facts.199 Voters still
need reliable sources of information.200 One of the
silver linings of COVID-19 has been the time to
produce scholarship to provide further insight,
both collectively and individually.201 This is a
moment to reframe the questions and explore our
anxieties about engaging the state to work for the
benefit of the people.
As the trifecta pandemic—poverty, racism,
and COVID-19-health crisis—in the United
States has shown, many Americans function on
long-held biases. So, when explaining societal
problems, these biases, at a minimum, ought to
be consistently applied. For instance, if market
performance is key for judging the poor’s moral
behavior (using Buchanan’s jargon), then it should
be key for the rich’s appraisal. Do poor mothers
really need immediate participation in the job
market to ensure that they have sufficient skills to
lift themselves and their children out of poverty? I
do not know the answer. But if our liberal society
expects poor single mothers to participate in the
See, e.g., Dana Neacsu, Political Satire and Political
News: Entertaining, Accidentally Reporting or Both?
The Case of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (TDS)
(Oct. 3, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rutgers University) (https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/
D8959RJ7).
199
See generally Kimiz Dalkir, Rebecca Katz (eds.) Navigating Fake News, Alternative Facts, and Misinformation in
a Post-truth World (2020).
200
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201
See generally Dana Neacsu, The Bourgeois Charm of
Karl Marx & the Ideological Irony of American Jurisprudence (2020) (for a meaning making theory focused on
jurisprudence and legal scholarship).
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labor market, then it should request the same of
the affluent, who should engage in some form
of activity in addition to being “born” into the
corporate, affluent class?202 Otherwise, if the
affluent reap the benefits of their status, so ought
poor mothers reap the same benefits by the fact of
their motherhood. Cammett notes that:
Scholars have long recognized that
family support programs in the
United States are premised on the
idea that family dependency is a
private matter. Moreover, the current
approach seems to recognize no role
for the state in honoring poor women’s
agency—outside of their right to
find employment—or giving them
meaningful choices.203
Politically, after decades of failing the vulnerable,
understandably, people cannot imagine the
state in a role of positive, proactive engagement
in addressing family financial problems. But
advocating to rid liberal capitalism of such welfare
services would come at costs hard to imagine for
democracy. If it survives, it would be reduced to
an empty label, reminiscent of all the labels Soviet
Russia used to cover up its political travesty. For
instance, in a recent work on the Rule of Law of
the Soviet empire, a Telos scholar explained its
“nominal constitutionalism.” He noted that it:
consists [of] a rare combination of
secular ideology, law, and social
reconstruction policy. In this sense,
nominal constitutionalism, as opposed
to a real one, has three principle
characteristic features: (1) the absence
of realizable human rights norms; (2)
the rejection of the judicial control
of constitutionality (only political or
ideological control); and (3) great
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flexibility (the substance of each
norm or constitutional provision
can be profoundly transformed via
logical, semantic, and teleological
interpretations and thus used in the
interest of political power).204
This nominal constitutionalism is not so foreign
from our American shores, either. It started
under the former-President Ronald Reagan’s
administration, with scholarly help from James
M. Buchanan and Milton Friedman.205 It focuses
on diminishing the services of the welfare state
built by previous democratic administrations.206 It
continued under the Trump administration, when
“nominal democracy” became our governmental
mantra and Buchanan’s influence reached its
apex.207 For four years, we succumbed to Trump’s
rambling208 in lieu of John Stuart Mills’s liberal
free-market of ideas.209 However, former President
Trump’s authoritarianism210 had no soviet roots:
he unabashedly threatened the electorate that if
he was re-elected, he would continue to defy the
powers of his office. He bragged about defunding
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both Social Security and Medicare, two of the
pillars of the liberal welfare state.211 And there
were no checks and balances insight. For the first
time since the Civil War, the Rule of Law could
not protect the current version of the American
democracy. The abandonment of due process
and even of the much-admired checks and
balances did not happen overnight.212 It came after
decades of decentralized government services and
privatization when no one seemed in charge or
cared about stewarding the American democratic
experiment.
And then, COVID-19 happened. Only in one
quarter, during the pandemic, when the American
economy fell to post-World War II levels,213 the
top one percent saw their worth increase.214 Voters
could continue to ignore reality, and legal scholars
could continue to embrace the Nobel Prizewinning theory of the day. But reality catches up
with myths, and the difference between a vibrant
democracy and a nominal democracy is that
we, the people, do not have to accept it.215 The
American people still have the voting booth, and
Camille Caldera, Fact Check: President Trump Has Not Said
He Will Terminate Social Security, USA Today (Aug. 15, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/08/15/
fact-check-donald-trump-hasnt-said-he-terminate-social-security/3343439001/ (“Trump deferred the tax that funds Social
Security, and vowed to ‘terminate’ the tax in the future. The vast
majority of Social Security is financed through the payroll tax,
according to the Social Security Administration.”).
212
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on November 20, 2020, they rejected this nominal
democracy. The ravages of COVID-19 magnified
our democratic ills. As of June 2020,216 the United
States, with only four percent of the world’s
population, represented twenty-five percent of the
world’s coronavirus cases.217 Any plan to address
that impact at any level could have only (and
luckily did) come from the federal government,218
not a mutual aid society.
With the new Biden administration in the United
States and the recent $1.9 trillion U.S. dollars
rescue package bill, there is hope that our most
vulnerable Americans will receive the muchneeded help.219 The bill is not charity; it is a mere
attempt to ensure compliance with human rights
international access standards. It is not mutual aid.
It is what Americans deserve from a democratic
government. It is needed for basic socio-economic
human rights.
Fifteen years ago, I argued that the American
welfare system needed a makeover.220 That call
remains actual today. The American societal
ailments are dynamic, which means we need
to build on the democratic welfare state’s social
services, including health, employment, senior
care, and policies establishing a minimum wage,
the length of the working day, retirement, and
accident insurance. These programs are the
backbone of the United States’ liberal democracy.
The United States needs to improve their scope
and delivery, and scholars ought not to collaborate
in their demise because Americans might discover
Scottie Andrew, The US has 4% of the world’s population but
25% of its coronavirus cases, CNN (June 30, 2020), https://www.
cnn.com/2020/06/30/health/us-coronavirus-toll-in-fd-junetrnd/index.html.
217
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that as flexible as we believe liberal democracy is, it
is only as flexible as a Rubik’s Cube.

